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INTRODUCTION
Applying the System Dynamics (SD) method to
foster organizational change, accountability and
to support effective decisionmaking in the public
sector implies a number of challenges which are
interrelated, not only because of the specific
complexity of the public sector itself (Bianchi,
2010), but also as a consequence of the idiosyn-
crasies that characterise a particular geographical
area.
Such issues can be referred to four main
interdependent sub-systems, that should be
taken into account when applying SD to enhance
organizational change programs in the public
sector, that is the:
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As Figure 1 suggests, the implementation of
programs aimed at fostering change, account-
ability and the improvement of service to users,
and to thewider community, could be addressed
by predominantly focussing on the organization
system (e.g. on processes, roles and respon-
sibilities, planning and reporting, career and
reward/incentive schemes), and at the same
time be hampered by a lack of attention to the
wider socio-economic, political, and institu-
tional systems with whom an organization in
the public sector interacts. Although such factors
may be considered outside the scope of a
traditional organizational intervention, ignoring
them may cause a failure in reaching the
objectives stated. Such a failure may arise from
relying on the hypothesis that improving the
organization system itself will, cause an
improvement in the overall performance as
well. However, this hypothesis may not be valid
for a number of reasons.
First, a public sector organization is tightly
connected to other independent (loosely
coupled) public sector organizations, whose
policies may affect (positively or adversely) the
implementation of its organizational change
programs (Bianchi, 2010). The rules and legisla-
tive schemes which define such relationships can
be referred to as the institutional system that also
deals with relationships between the public
administration system and external actors (e.g.
citizens and private sector organisations).1
Second, the above rules of conduct are not only
‘coded’ by the formal institutional system; in fact,
an informal political system defines how power is
actually exerted and how the different roles
which are ruled by the institutional system are
played. This is affected by the hidden (social)
rules of conduct leading to set political priorities
in the allocation of resources, and to outlining
community goals. Ignoring such a political
system may significantly tackle any change
program which only takes into account the
managerial view of a public sector organization.
Third, since both the institutional and political
systems are an expression of the emerging (or
leading) culture and values arising from the
underlying wider socio-economic systems, any
public sector organizational change program
ought to take into account what opportunities
there exist to affect, in the long term, such a
culture and values, possibly with the aim of
changing the context (i.e. both the institutional
and political system) in which the management
operates.
When applied to the Italian context, the above
analysis is relevant to a wide scope of challenges
associated with an effective implementation of
public sector organization change programs, and
the use of SD to support them.
In particular, this paper aims at highlighting
two challenges, that is the need to:
1. Properly address the relationships between
the political and the organizational (manage-
rial) system. On this concern, primary research
questions are the following:
1.a How can SD facilitate a better under-
standing of the (often hidden) relation-
ships between the two systems?
1.b How can SD foster a better communi-
cation and strategic dialogue between
politicians and managers, with the intent
to improve policy making and imple-
mentation?
2. Promptly attain efficiency and improve out-
come at the same time, given the current
constraints that the institutional and political
Figure 1 Four main sub-systems affecting organizational
change interdependently in the public sector (adapted from
Borgonovi, 1996, p. 105)
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systems constitute. In this regard, primary
research questions are the following:
2.a How can SD support management to keep
under control the key performance vari-
ables driving to the success or failure of
their organizations?
2.b How can SD support management to
improve social reporting on the outcomes
generated by implemented strategies?
Based on a case analysis conducted by the
authors, in the next sections of this paper, we will
provide insights into the challenges listed above.
While the three following cases are from quite
different contexts (i.e. water public utilities,
health care, opera production and staging), their
analyses suggest the existence of a number of
commonalities that may offer possible answers to
the above research questions.
In particular, the first case-study provides an
example of a Public Utility (PU) whose lack of
efficiency and effectiveness is due to huge
political interferences into the organisation
system. The second case illustrates financial
and social dysfunctions generated into the health
care organisation system by setting surgery
tariffs at political level disregarding the clinical
context. The third case shows how keeping under
control the key performance variables in a
municipal theatre may allow managers to attain
efficiency and improve outcome.
Though the analysis of all the three cases tries
to provide insights on both the above sets of
challenges, the first two cases primarily address
the research questions 1.a, 1.b and 2.b. The third
case is more focused on the research question 2.a.
The first two case-studies also differ from the
third, if we consider the perspective through
which they are framed. In fact, they remark the
role SD can play to analyse and diagnose a
complex problem by combining a macro (i.e. the
institutional and political systems) with a micro
(i.e. the organisation system) view (Bianchi,
2010). The third case emphasises the role SD
can play in supporting the implementation of
policies aimed to recover efficiency and effec-
tiveness at a micro level (i.e. the organisation
system).
FOSTERING ACCOUNTABILITY IN
PUBLIC UTILITIES: THE ‘ACQUA SPA’
CASE-STUDY2
Introduction
Particularly in the last decade, the debate on the
causes of the failure of PU performance improve-
ment programs seems to be focused on two main
aspects, that is the intervention field and the
reform of legal issues ruling the status of PUs.
Under the first viewpoint, it has been shown
(World Bank, 2004) that the core of such
interventions has been exclusively on the organ-
ization system, rather than also on the wider
context in which such companies operate. This
narrow focus implies that, to improve PU
performance, it is sufficient to undertake a
reorganization process aimed to improve out-
comes, efficiency, effectiveness and financial
balance.
Under the second viewpoint, reforms have
been oriented to separate the responsibilities of
the three main involved actors, that is: owners,
Board and management (Baietti et al., 2006). Such
goal has been primarily pursued by changing the
legal status of organisations, from a ‘statutory
body’ to a limited corporation totally owned by
local institutions. This policy, borrowed from the
private sector, has proven ineffective since it does
not address the public sector’s peculiar complex-
ity. In particular, PU ownership has not been
separated from external political interventions
aimed to satisfy the interest of restricted groups
of stakeholders with the intent to gain consensus
leading to re-election (Shapiro and Willig, 1990;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).
To improve PUs performance, it is not
sufficient to act into the PU organization per
se. On the contrary, it is necessary to outline the
relationships between the institutional, political
and socio-economic systems, providing the
context in which PUs operate. At least in Italy,
such relationships often generate unsatisfactory
results, in terms of both financial and service
performance.
2This case-study has been written by Carmine Bianchi, Enzo Bivona,
Tiziana Landi and Paolo Ricci.
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A major cause of this phenomenon can be
attributed to the high influence of politicians in
appointing the PUs Board of Directors to satisfy
their own parties’ interest and to promote social
consensus aimed to re-election.
A related cause of poor PU performance can be
also attributed to the wider socio-economic
system where such institutions operate. In fact,
a political system in which people culture and
dominant values are oriented to the search of
personnel favour and influence peddling may
provide a fertile field for unethical behaviour
leading to inequality, inefficiency and poor
outcomes for the citizen. Therefore, even the
best change-oriented programs focused on the
organisation system and the best legislative
innovations aimed to regulate the institutional
system (in particular, concerning the Municipal-
ity-PU relationship) are destined to fail if a
systems approach is not adopted.
On the basis of the above remarks, the next
section will illustrate a public water utility case-
study operating in Southern Italy and show
preliminary findings about main factors affecting
PU performance. The case-study analysis has
been conducted based on the conceptual frame-
work previously used in an international
research (Baietti et al., 2006) aimed at outlining
main external and internal factors affecting
public water utilities performance.
By the light of the case-study analysis, some
vicious circles leading to PU performance
deterioration due to political interferences have
been outlined and alternative intervention
policies explored.
The ACQUA SpA Case-Study
Introduction and General Description
ACQUA SpA3 is a joint stock company estab-
lished in 2003. It is owned by a large number of
small municipalities (about 128) located in
Southern Italy, and provides water supply and
sewerage services to more than 450,000 users.
Table 1 reported below summarises main com-
pany data.
In order tomake explicit main decisionmaking
processes affecting PU performance, the case-
study analysis has been carried out by taking into
account two complimentary perspectives. The
first refers to the institutional environment in
which the PU operates. The second identifies the
main internal factors affecting PU performance.
Table 1 General characteristics of ACQUA
General characteristics of ACQUA 2005 2006 2007
Population served 450,000 450,000 451,290
Connections 202,748 205,462 208,474
Numbers of employees 409 410 406
Working ratio 64% 64% 64%
Staff per 1000 connections 0.80 0.81 0.82
Staff per 1000 population served 1.77 1.77 1.78
Accounts receivable as a share of
annual revenue, expressed in month’s sales
76% 89% 88%
Water supply N/A 69,783,898 67,482,428
Water supply turnover (m3) 35,836,590 36,149,555 36,376,354
Unaccounted for water (m3) N/A 33,634,343 31,106,074
Unaccounted for water (%) N/A 48 46
Average domestic tariff (s/m3) 0.63 0.63 0.63
Revenues s39,709,699 s37,422,815 s35,514,684
Operating costs s37,801,388 s38,615,585 s44,862,991
Net profit (loss) s361.854 s27.864,00 s (9.480.079,00)
3The name of the PU has been intentionally disguised.
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The Institutional Environment
The Institutional environment can be associated
with two main issues: the external autonomy and
the external accountability. The first relates to the
degree of independence of the PUmanagers from
external interferences in decision-making. The
second issue refers to the extent the PU responds
to external stakeholders on precise performance
indicators, based on which incentives are pro-
vided.
In terms of external autonomy, as ACQUA SpA
is a joint stock company, it has a strong formal
independent status. The utility is governed by a
board of directors consisting of five persons, who
are appointed by municipalities. However, since
ACQUA SpA is owned by a large number of
small municipalities, this often tackles the ability
to achieve mutually agreed decisions on Board
nominations. Therefore, political parties often
take a leading role in designating the members of
such boards. This turns the PU external auto-
nomy into a formal state only.
Members of the Board are often appointed on
the basis of their ‘political affiliation’4and rarely
on their professional experience. This phenom-
enon is consistent with the research conducted by
Gutiérrez and Menozzi (2008) on 114 Italian
public utilities in a 10-year period. In particular,
the study demonstrates that unnecessary staff is
often hired, through politicians influences on the
Board, and such decisions have a negative impact
on PU performance.
Such phenomenon can be empirically found in
the ACQUA SpA, and explains its significant
financial losses recorded in 2007. In particular, by
comparing 2006 and 2007 results, it is possible to
detect a 5% decrease in revenues and, at the same
time, a 14% increase in the total costs.A significant
part of such an increase is due to personnel costs.5
In order to recover such a negative perform-
ance, ACQUA SpA can not autonomously define
the water tariff. In fact, water distribution tariff is
determined by a national law, based on the
investment plan adopted by the PU, and should
allow the PU to earn a 7% annual return on
capital invested.
Concerning the external accountability, the
current PU targets (in terms of revenues, water
production, distribution, consumption, unac-
counted water and new connections), that are
made explicit in the annual budget and sub-
mitted by the board of directors to shareholders,
are quite easily to achieve in comparison to the
available resources. For instance, there is not a
significant evidence of the effort done by the
company to recover the very high percentage
(about the 50%) of the annual unaccountedwater.
The above remarks also suggest that perform-
ance targets are not perceived by shareholders as
a way of pressuring the utility to improve its
results. Rather, as long as ACQUA SpA accom-
plishes its main task of providing reliable water
services, shareholders do not intervene.
The PU Organization Setting
Among the internal factors that are likely to affect
PU performance, the degrees of internal autonomy
and accountability, and customer orientation can be
taken into account.
The decision making process in ACQUA SpA
is highly centralised. Although the company is
organised in different departments, each head of
these units has a limited decision power and very
bounded autonomy. In fact, most decisions are
made by the managing director and approved by
the board of directors. The board mainly focuses
on strategic decision making and the managing
director focuses on only operational decisions.
The decisions that are typically made by the
managing director, and authorised by the Board,
are those related to the approval of the procure-
ment of goods and services and the hiring of
employees. As a consequence, the above de-
cisions can be influenced by those politicianswho
appointed the board members.
The high level of influence of political parties
through the Board on the PU strategic decisions
can be also explained by the low level of
4According to Gutiérrez and Menozzi, and the prevailing literature
(Faccio, 2005), a director has a ‘political affiliation’ when he/she has
alternatively one of the following roles: (a) an active position (or has
been active) in the recent past in the political arena, (b) an official
political position (for instance, deputy of the national Parliament,
member of Regional, Provincial or Municipal governments), (c) been
(or is) candidate for election, (d) a membership in a political party or a
friendship with people associated with a political party.
5This phenomenon can not be explained by looking at the operational
side of the company, as the population served is stable. On the
contrary, the increase in (unnecessary) human resources could be
interpreted as a result of political pressures on the PU.
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company internal accountability and transpar-
ency. For instance, the company does not adopt
any system to evaluate employees’ performance.
Although some managers undertake employees
evaluations at their own initiative, these evalu-
ations are not structured. The formal respect of
procedures is perceived as more important than
meeting performance targets.
Furthermore, ACQUA SpA has a weak orien-
tation towards customers. This can be detected
by several factors. First, there is not a formal
procedure on how to deal with customers’
complaints and response times to complaints
are not available. Second, benchmarking is in its
infant stage. It focuses on tariffs, water quality,
level of services and efficiency. However, its
outcomes are not used in company strategic or
operational plans. Finally, although the company
introduced a customer charter, it does not
conduct any market survey aimed at detecting
the perception of the level of customer satisfac-
tion.
Vicious Circles Leading to ACQUA SpA Perfor-
mance Deterioration due to Political Interferences
A feedback analysis can be helpful in high-
lighting the vicious loops that have been affecting
the company performance. On this regard,
staffing and procurement processes will be
analysed.
Figure 2 shows how overstaffing, that is the
hiring of unnecessary (and often unqualified)
staff due political interferences into the company
management, decreases staff motivation and
skills, the level of service provided to customers
and PU performance. In turn, the poor PU
performance raises municipality subsidies to
financially sustain the organisation. At the same
time, such public fund intervention empowers
municipal political representatives to intervene
in the PU decision making process, for instance,
by ‘recommending’ the desired people to hire
(see reinforcing loop R1 in Figure 2).
The above interference in the managerial
decision making process is also likely to produce
a decline in the level of ‘PU management
autonomy’ and, hence motivation, leading to a
further drop in PU performance (see reinforcing
loop R2 in Figure 2).
Finally, overstaffing also produces an increase
in personnel costs, without a significant contri-
bution in terms of efficiency or effectiveness. This
phenomenon boosts operating costs, which
causes a decay in PU results, and reinforces
politicians interferences (see reinforcing loop R3
in Figure 2).
Another area of political interferences in the
PU autonomy refers to suppliers’ selection. This
is likely to generate two other vicious circles
leading to PU performance deterioration (see
reinforcing loop R4 and R5 in Figure 3). In fact, an
intervention in the managerial decision process
reduces PU managers autonomy, leading to a
drastic drop in their motivation. Moreover, this
phenomenon increases operating costs (e.g. due
to low quality raw materials), and therefore
reduces performance. A lower performance,
increases debts and the degree of external
dependence, and provides the basis for further
illegal political interventions on company activi-
ties.
Concluding Remarks on the ACQUA SpA
Case
Based on the above analysis, it is possible to
outline intervention policies to allow the PU to
recover sustainable competitiveness and financial
equilibrium, at least in the long run. The possible
levers onwhich to act should be related to the sub-
Figure 2 Vicious circles leading to PU performance
deterioration due to political pressure to hire desired (unqua-
lified) staff
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systems described in Figure 1, that is: the
institutional, political and public utility systems.
Figure 4 shows that, in order to counterbalance
the vicious effects generated by the reinforcing
loop R1, a first balancing loop could be fostered
by introducing consistent changes in the system of
rules, which discipline the roles and responsi-
bilities of various actors operating not only
inside, but also outside the PU. As the loop B1
in Figure 4 shows, the need for such policy
should be directly related to the level of political
interferences. On this regard, therefore, it is
critical not only the quality of adopted changes in
the system of rules, but also the time and the
extent to which the phenomenon of political
interferences is perceived as a threat to the
survival of the community. As the above B1 loop
shows, the positive effects produced by changes
in rules determine a reduction in political
interferences.
Concerning the second subsystem (i.e. the
political one), another balancing loop could be
fostered by introducing new frameworks implying
social/political accountability. The adoption of such
frameworks would allow the community to
evaluate the effectiveness of political action
and related outcome. In order to achieve this
goal, however, it is also necessary that the
community develops a culture oriented towards
the proper role of the PUs in society (e.g. to satisfy
citizen’s needs), rather than perceiving such
companies as a means to opportunistically obtain
favours from politicians through influence ped-
dling. As the B2 loop in Figure 4 shows, such a
policy can be fostered by a proper and timely
perception of poor PU performance and its
negative effects on the social costs of poor
services. This would determine a drop of social
consensus for re-election, leading to a reduction
in political interferences.
Concerning the third subsystem (i.e. the
organisation sub-system), another balancing loop
could be fostered by introducing new mechan-
isms inside the PU, aimed to improve the quality
of management systems. Also in this case, such a
policy should be fostered by the perception of
unsatisfactory PU performance levels. The adop-
tion of proper systems to increase the quality of
Figure 4 Intervention policies to recover PU sustainable competitiveness and financial equilibrium
Figure 3 Vicious circles leading to PU performance
deterioration due to political pressure into the procurement
processes
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managers, together with reduced political influ-
ences leading to higher managerial autonomy
(and possibly also supported by the hiring of
skilled employees), would determine an increase
in PU performance (see loop B3 in Figure 4). In
fact, a PU performance lower than a desired level,
would determine the need of a higher quality in
management systems (e.g. in terms of hiring
qualified personnel, improving organisation
structure and processes, information, planning
and control systems). A higher quality ofmanage-




PERSPECTIVES IN DRG SETTING: FROM
AN OUTPUT TO A PATIENT-OUTCOME
VIEWPOINT. THE ISMETT CASE-STUDY6
Introduction
In Italy the majority of healthcare is provided by
the State, funded from general taxation. The
provider is called SSN, that is Servizio Sanitario
Nazionale (National Healthcare System). Italy’s
health care system is a regionally based national
health service that provides universal coverage
free of charge at the point of service.
The system is organized at a national and
regional level. The national level is responsible
for ensuring the general objectives and funda-
mental principles of the national health care
system. Regional governments, through the
regional health departments, are responsible
for ensuring the delivery of a benefit package
through a network of population-based health
management Organizations (local health units)
and public and private accredited hospitals.
Hospital carehas always represented the largest
share of health care expenditure and has often
been a source of major concern to the central
government. In the 1990s the Italian government
has established that the hospital payments will be
made through a system called DRG—Diagnosis-
related group (Hsiao et al., 1986).
The DRG system has been developed and used
in USA since 1983, with the purpose to determine
how much the Government (Medicare) pays the
hospital. It is a system to classify hospital cases
into one of approximately 500 groups (also each
called simply DRGs), expected to have similar
hospital resource use. The DRGs are assigned by
a ‘grouper’ software based on a coding system
called ICD-9-CM, indicating diagnoses, pro-
cedures, age, sex, and the presence of compli-
cations or co-morbidities.
Since patients within each category are similar
clinically and are expected to use the same level
of hospital resources, this DRG system is used for
both hospital payments and for hospital per-
formance measurements.
Hospital Performance Measurements
The DRG system provides a large amount of
information and many quantity measurements
and a quality measurements can be provided.
The most frequent information/indicators uti-
lized are:
Volumes Patients discharged: inpatient and day
hospital/day surgery
Type Each of the approx 500 DRGs is classified
as a medical or a surgical type
ALOS The average length of stay indicates the
duration the patient stay for each
classification
Weight Each of the DRGs has assigned a weight
that measures the amount of resources an
a average basis that are required for that
patient stay
Fee The DRG fee is the amount of revenue
that the hospital will receive for that
specific classification
Most of the standard performance indicators
that are DRG-related provide quantity type
measurements such as volumes, surgical percen-
tages, patient days, occupancy rates, etc.
There are even some quality measurements;
probably the most important and most utilized is
the DRG weight. This is called even a complexity
6This case-study has been written by Carmine Bianchi and Pietro
Ferrara.
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index that qualifies the level of complexity of a
specific hospital.
This type of performance indicators does not
cope the need to include for each classification
some process measurement indicators (e.g.,
drugs, medical supplies, physician decisions,
etc.). This need is originated by the conviction
that each patient in several cases is unique and
his/her treatment therefore could be signifi-
cantly different inside the same DRG classifi-
cation.
Does the DRG Classification Capture the
Technological Progress in Medicine?
A puzzling and recurring problem is related to
the above issues. To what extent does the DRG
foster or hinder technological progress in medi-
cine?
Such question is relevant to the subject of this
paper, since it refers to the relationships between
the political and organisation system, in the
wider public sector. In this case, the political
system settles the DRG policy, while the
organisation system (i.e. hospitals) manages
service provision and related technological
implications.
To address the above question, a case example
will be considered: the ‘trans-jugular intra-
hepatic portal systemic shunt’ (TIPS).
DRG N. 191
and 192




Description This is an interventional radiology
procedure called TIPS for the
prevention of recurrent variceal
bleeding
Beside any consideration of clinical advantage,
which is not the scope of this paper, the interest
lays on the alternatives of medical supplies
utilized for this procedure and their effect on
the results for the patient’s outcome.
In the beginning, for the TIPS procedure was
used a bare stent that presented the disadvantage
of requiring a strict surveillance program and
repeated reinterventions (several procedures and
hospitalization for the patient) for preserving its
patency, with a marked increase of the overall
cost over that of the initial procedure.
Afterwards, the technological progress in
medicine has introduced new and advanced
materials, in fact the rates of stent dysfunction
and reinterventions have been significantly
reduced by the utilization of these new covered
stents. The experience at ISMETT,7 with 106
patients who underwent bare stent and 111
covered stent TIPS, further confirms these results
(see Figure 5).
The use of covered stent (nowadays the
standard of use) would much improve the cost
effectiveness of TIPS. In fact, since the only
difference between the two treatments was the
number of reinterventions for maintaining the
shunt patent, it is conceivable that overcoming
this problem would result not only in a marked
reduction of the overall treatment cost, but also in
an appreciable improvement of the quality of life.
In fact, the patient would reduce the times of
hospitalization.
From a DRG stand point, which sometimes
becomes the hospital perspective, the results
could be interpreted significantly differently. The
Figure 5 Cumulative proportion of patients free of TIPS
dysfunction according to the type of stent received (numbers
below the abscissa are patients still free of TIPS dysfunction
per each observation period. Patients were treated at
ISMETT, Palermo)
7ISMETT is an hospital based in Palermo and related to the Pittsburgh
University, USA. ISMETT is an excellent centre for transplants in the
Southern Italy.
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DRG revenue using either type of stents (bare or
coated) is the same, but the hospital’s cost only
for the stent is much different (the bare cost 25%
compared to the coated). This is the first potential
advantage.
Adopting the bare stent the hospital would
probably need to have the patient repeat the
procedure every 12–18 months, and con-
sequently earn an extra DRG revenue for each
time that patient repeats the procedure. This is
the second factor that could incentive the hospital
in using a certain protocol.
It is possible that if the hospital would follow a
blind path towards the Profit and Loss statement,
associated with the weaknesses of the DRG
system to detect these differences, the patient
outcome would not be addressed.
Implications for Public Policy/Management,
and System Dynamics Modelling
DRGs are a well-established provider payment
system. Because of their imminent potential of
cost reduction, they have beenwidely introduced
by many governments.
But we have seen that there could be potential
pitfall of the objectives between the DRG system
and patient outcome. The first is a mandatory
hospital measurement tool that provides a
measure of revenue (cost) and productivity.
The second should be the fundamental part of
all hospital’s mission.
On this regard, a number of questions for
policy makers should be considered while
drafting the national and regional health plan:
is there a detachment in the objectives between the
policy maker (regional government) and the process
maker (physician or hospital administrator)? Could
the performance indicators contemplate the patient
outcome?
A Preliminary Analysis of the Problem
Through the System Dynamics Approach
Unintended consequences associated to DRG
funding are not a new phenomenon. Particularly
in the last decade, several studies have been
highlighting the outcomes originated by regu-
latory policies undertaken by public sector
organizations in order to foster efficiency and
effectiveness in health care systems.8
On this regard, the so called ‘DRG-creep’
phenomenon has been emphasized by various
authors. This implies that ‘patients are placed in
higher priced DRGs than their actual state of
health would warrant’ (Christensen et al., 2004).
Other unintended consequences of DRG fund-
ing have been related to the tendency of some
hospitals to increase the volume of patients, in
order to maximize the flow of revenues (being
DRGs related to the diagnosis that originates a
hospital service), or to affect the case-mix (e.g. by
encouraging the admission of those patients
whose DRG is higher than others) (Mikkola et al.,
2001; Kamke, 1998; Sheigold, 1986). Early dis-
charge rates have also been referred as common
practices in the field (Cantù et al., 2008).
Related to this phenomenon, not only a typical
problem of goals avoidance driven by opportu-
nistic behaviour following the introduction of
performance measurement frameworks, but also
a service quality phenomenon arises. In fact, a
focus of performance measurement frameworks
on only outputs, rather than also outcomes, at
least in the perspective of hospitals, has been a
primary cause of their inclination to dismiss
patients ‘too quick’ (and often also ‘too sick’). For
this reason, the Swiss Cantons of Zurich and
Berne have recently re-modulated their own
DRG system on an outcome, rather than on an
input and output-only basis (Draghic, 2006).
Similar problems can be envisaged concerning
the previously described theme, that is: capturing
medical and technological progress in DRG
framework systems. The case-study described
above clearly illustrates how anchoring DRGs on
only a nominal classification of medical or
surgical type, rather than also on the technology
used in medical care, can be a major cause of
8More widely speaking, health care has proven a fertile field for SD
modelling. Though a detailed analysis of the SD literature is not the
focus of this study, we may here remind some of the most represen-
tative studies covering both macro (e.g. regional health care systems;
Vennix and Gubbels, 1994; Wolstenholme, 1999) and micro (e.g. hos-
pitals; Lane and Huseman, 2008) perspectives of applications. In
particular, on SD applied to DRG policies, see: Maliapen and Danger-
field, 2009; Trailer and McLaughlin, 2007.
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unintended negative effects, leading to higher
heath care system costs on a longer time
perspective.
Figure 6 shows how – according to the current
policy – setting a given threshold in regional
health care costs implies a reduction in DRGs, if
the current regional expenses for healthcare are
higher than the budget (i.e. the threshold). The
balancing loop depicted in the figure shows the
effect that such a policy is meant to generate: the
higher costs, the higher the gap will be; a higher
gap will reduce DRGs (or will contain them); this
would lead to lower costs, that would allow the
Regional administration to meet the budget
threshold.
In the case here described, this phenomenon is
observed in the short term. In fact, such a policy
only aims to foster efficiency improvements in
the different organizations operating in a
regional healthcare system.
Nevertheless, such an indiscriminate cost-
reducing – and (more specifically) revenue
cutting – policy naturally generates an incli-
nation of hospitals to reduce the quality of their
services. In such case, this implies a lower
inclination to adopt more sophisticated and
innovative surgical technologies, since their
costs would not permit hospitals to meet the
DRG targets.
Therefore, such a myopic DRG policy is
likely to generate a lower inclination to
innovate in hospital heath care. This would,
in turn, lead – after a delay – to an increase in
the stock of patients needing treatment, because
of the flow of patients needing reinterventions.
Such a phenomenon may determine a new
strong increase in the current regional treat-
ment costs.
The above described series of events generates
in the long run a reinforcing loop, linking costs to
DRGs, and DRGs to the inclination to innovate,
to patients needing retreatment and to costs
again.
The same phenomena can be depicted through
a SD simulation model (Figure 7).9
The basic structure of this insight model,
consisting of the two interconnected stocks, aims
to reproduce the same behaviour observed in
Figure 5.
It is hypothesized here that a stock of 100
patients needing treatment is drained by the flow
of new treated patients, as an outflow of patients
receiving surgical operations (the average recov-
ery time is here an input parameter, equal to 12
months). Such an outflow accumulates into the
stock of treated patients, whose initial value has
been supposed also 100 people. This last stock is
drained by the outflow named ‘Patients needing
retreatment’. Such variable is the ratio between
the ‘Treated patients’ stock and the average
retreatment time associated to the adopted
technology: the bar stent technology implies a
30 months, while the covered stent technology
implies a 220 months period.10
The results portrayed by the simulation model
confirm how the current policy (which is – at least
implicitly – oriented to adopt the bar stent
technology) tends to increase, over a 4-year
period, the level of patients needing treatment.
Such phenomenon is due to the higher volume of
the flow of patients needing retreatment over the
same time horizon.
The model also shows that a higher stock of
patients needing treatment – for the first policy,
in respect to the second one – originates a higher
flow of new treated patients, that is a greater
number of surgical operations. Therefore, such
operations generate unintended higher costs for
the regional heath care system.
Figure 6 Short and long term effects from myopic DRG
setting by Regional policy makers.
9Model Equations are available on request from the authors.
10The above two parameters have been set in a way that – given a stock
equal to 100 treated patients – the corresponding survival curves can
approximate to those in Figure 5.
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This phenomenon is more evident if we
include in the model another inflow into the
stock of ‘Patients needing treatment’. Such an
inflow corresponds to the new patients to treat,
that is to the number of new surgery treatments
to make for the first time on patients. The test
data for this inflow has been set to a constant of 4
patients per month.
On this regard, Figure 8 shows that while the
dynamics of such stock portrays an increasing
pattern of behaviour in the first run, it rather
declines in the second run. The cause of this
phenomenon is associated to the higher stock of
treated patients, leading to higher volumes of
patients needing retreatment over time. From the
second graph of Figure 8 it is possible to observe
how the higher value of this stock generates a
much higher volume of patients needing a new
surgical operation, if the first current policy (bar
stent) is adopted.
Key:
Policy 1: Bar stent policy (solid line).
Policy 2: Covered stent policy (dotted line).
The insight SD model also embodies an analysis
of the regional DRG setting policies. As shown in
the stock and flow model depicted in Figure 10
here we have a threshold for regional treatment
costs on the above TIP disease treatment, that is:
s70.000 per month.11
The corresponding current regional treatment
costs are calculated as a product between the flow
of new treated patients and the average unit
DRG.
Figure 7 A stock- and flow-diagram model showing short and long term effects from myopic DRG setting by Regional policy
makers: Effects of Regional DRG Policies on costs
11This is also a test – rather than – empirical value.
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Based on such threshold, the current regional
policy is to initially set the DRG at s8.400 per
treated patient.12 Such a parameter is related to
the ‘Low DRG policy’ factor, which currently
determines a high percentage of cases treated
through the bar stent technology. The model
shows that such DRG is set according to the ratio
between the regional treatment cost threshold
and the perceived current number of treated
patients.13 Therefore, during the simulation, if
the DRG is based on the current approach (‘Low
DRG policy’), the average unit DRGwill decrease
if (given a threshold level for TIP disease
treatment) the flow of new treated patients will
increase.
According to an alternative hypothesis, the
DRG on TIP disease treatment recognized to
hospitals wishing to adopt the covered stent
technology, could be set to s16.000. Although
such a substantial increase would not represent a
multiple of 4 (i.e. the estimated cost ratio between
the two technologies), with respect to the DRG
recognized to the hospitals using the older
technology, this higher DRG might encourage
innovation policies in surgery operations. Simu-
lation results will show now that an even higher
DRGwould be unsustainable, in consideration of
the budget threshold.
Figure 8 Results from two simulation runs (second version of the SD model)
12Based on such DRG, current regional treatment costs per month, at
the beginning of the simulation, meet the budget, that is: s8.400! 8.33
patients/month"s70.000/month.
13Due to the relative difficulty to reduce the DRG in the short time, the
observation delay for the ‘New treated patients’ flow has been set to 5
years.
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From Figure 7 it is also possible to observe that
the policy maker may operate through a check
button and a slider bar, decisions on DRG
policies. Precisely, the simulator ‘policy switch’
enables one to use either the current policy
(implying a low and undifferentiated DRG) or a
‘higher DRG’ policy. If the player checks this last
option, then the simulator will use the (higher)
DRG, that is s16.000 per patient, as an input
parameter. Alternatively, the basic policy at the
beginning of the simulation is to set the DRG at
s8.400 per patient.
The simulation results portrayed in Figure 9
show the costs associated with the two
policies.14
The two simulation runs here show that,
although the ‘higher DRG’ policy implies in
the short term much higher costs than the ‘low
DRG’ policy, it becomesmore favourable after 2.5
years, because of the lower total DRGs associated
to patients retreatment (see ‘Gap in current
regional treatment costs’ dynamics).
In the long run, such a benefit tends to decline,
so that – at the end of the simulation – both
alternative policy results portray the same ‘gap
in current regional treatment costs’. Therefore,
none of them is able – by itself – to meet
the target. While the ‘higher DRG’ policy is
more expensive in the first period and more
effective in the second part of the simulation, the
‘low DRG’ policy shows a just opposite beha-
viour.
However, it is worth remarking that the
declining increase rate of the gap in the current
regional treatment costs, related to the ‘low DRG’
policy, is not due to a higher effectiveness of the
outcomes it generates. It only depends on the
gradual reduction in the average unit DRG
adopted by the regional policy makers – because
of the increasing volume of new treated patients –
in order to meet the budget threshold (see first
graph in Figure 9).
Key:
Policy 1: Bar stent policy (solid line).
Policy 2: Covered stent policy (dotted line).
Threshold for regional treatment costs (small-
dotted line).
However, such a lower DRG could prove to be
financially unsustainable for hospitals, also in the
case of adoption of a more traditional and less
expensive technology. Therefore – though the
model does not embody such set of possible
events – this could determine further inefficien-
cies (i.e. higher costs for the system) or further
drops in the levels of outcomes, which would in
turn determine a lower generated value on a
regional level.
Such hypothesis opens up the boundaries of
our model to the analysis of factors impacting on
the outcomes of health care policies. These
outcomes can be considered as a measure of
the capability of the regional health care system
to generate (i.e. to add) value to the community.
To this end, the inclination to innovate in hospital
care would be a major driver.
Therefore, in the long run, a higher capability of
the system to increase the value of health (at proper
efficiency standards) should be a measure that
could lead to a higher potential of a Region to
make the acquisition and allocation of financial
resources to its health care system sustainable in
the long run (see ‘R2’ reinforcing loop in
Figure 10).
Concluding Remarks on the ISMETT Case
The above analysis has shown that both simu-
lations policy results show that the budget
threshold is not met. This is not only, unlikely,
the result of an insight model with just test data.
It is, rather, one of the significant dynamic
complex problems that policy makers now face
in many Italian Regions.
The second simulation – as said – seems to
perform better than the first one, at least in the
medium long-run.
However, also the second simulation run does
not portray any radical solution to the problem of
meeting budget thresholds. In this case, results
can be preferable only because the DRG policy
can affect hospital behaviour not only on an
internal efficiency (i.e. resource consumption),
14Here, the simulation time horizon has been extended from 4 to 7
years, in order to better appreciate the expected long-term effects of
adopted policies on costs.
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Figure 9 Results from two simulation runs
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but also on an outcome perspective. This last
viewpoint, in turn, proves to be relevant also for
the efficiency of the regional system.
SDmodelling and simulation can substantially
help decision makers on a political and manage-
rial level to increase the level of synergy of their
own behaviour, with a view to improving the
performance of the overall relevant system, that
is – in this case – the regional health care system.
This is possible through various alternative or
complementary ways, which may imply, for
instance: assisted simulation sessions centred on
insight models, group model building sessions
(Vennix, 1996), the development and use of
models for planning and the assessment of policy
outcomes.
Obviously radical improvements in the sys-
tem’s performance – e.g. in terms of bothmeeting
budget costs thresholds and outcome levels,
could be pursued by deeper and wider scope
interventions, for example aimed at fostering
preventive care, or continuous home-care, so to
be able to decrease the two stocks of patients
depicted by the model, and therefore the costs of
hospital care.
Further applied research – also implying a
direct involvement in modelling by decision
makers operating in the political, managerial,
and medical settings, will be needed in order to
better explore such a dynamic complex and
considerable problem for our society.
IMPROVING PERFORMANCE THROUGH
A DYNAMIC BALANCED SCORECARD
FOR OPERA HOUSES15
Introduction
Nonprofit art firms, especially performing arts
firms, have to deal with a difficult problem: over
time costs tend to rise more rapidly then
revenues, thus generating a widening budget
gap. This is why most of the economic literature
(Heilbrun and Gray, 2001) on the subject focuses
on how demand can be increased in order to raise
revenue and on what performing arts firms can
do to lower their production costs.
Since Baumol and Bowen (1966) pioneering
study, economics offers an explanation to this
problem, an explanation called ‘cost disease’. The
heart of the cost disease theory posits the inability
of performing arts firms to enjoy productivity
advances relative to the rest of the economy. The
argument can be summarized as follows: It takes
70 musicians as much playing time to perform a
Beethoven symphony today as it did when the
piece was written. In other words, since the
performers’ labour is the output, there is no way
to increase output per unit of time. However, at
the same time, new productivity-enhancing
technologies have created huge increases in
labour productivity in other sectors of the
economy. Now, since wages tend to rise with
productivity all over the economy, the upward
pressure in the ‘progressive sectors’ will deter-
mine rising wages also in the ‘stagnant sectors’
(the orchestra). But since musicians’ productivity
has not changed, these higher wages in orchestra
are not compensated by higher revenues. The
result is that, over time, costs rise relative to
revenue. According to this explanation, the only
way for a nonprofit performing art firm to deal
with a widening budget gap is to increase
external resources, for example actively seeking
private grants and donations and/or asking for
more government funds.
Besides the cost disease, other arguments have
been invoked to justify public support to some
Figure 10 Impact of value generated by health care services
on the sustainability in the long run of DRG set by Regional
policy makers
15This case-study has been written by Carmine Bianchi and Antonio
Cognata.
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forms of artistic activities. The oldest and most
often invoked argument is that art, whatever its
form, is a public good (Frey and Pommerehne,
1989; Throsby, 2001). According to this argu-
ment, art benefits not only those who consume
and pay for it, but also all other citizens, who do
not necessarily wish to contribute voluntarily to
its production or to its preservation. For instance,
museums, opera houses, orchestras and art
festivals attract tourists and visitors and generate
spillover effects on hotels, restaurants and the
like. In this way, some people and firms gain a
benefit for which they do not pay, and which
therefore do not influence the production de-
cisions on art markets.
Art is also said to be a ‘merit good’, a means of
educating the public taste. Rather than accepting
consumers’ preferences, political decision
makers should decide production levels based
on the inherent worth of the artistic good. An
income distribution argument posits that the
consumption of arts should be open to all classes
of society and should not be reserved for the rich.
Therefore, the government should support the
arts in order to make consumption available to
those who are not able to pay for them.
Of course, on the subject of government
support of the arts, there are also many
counter-arguments. Some economists are uncon-
vinced of the relevance of the market failure
arguments and of the importance of the sup-
posed external effects. Public choice theorists
(Grampp, 1989) argue that government support
is often used by some people for their own
benefits. Empirical studies have shown that the
cost disease is not as severe as argued; that low
price elasticity of demand for performing arts
makes price increase possible; that technical
progress (e.g. DVD or broadcasting) may enlarge
audiences. Additionally, careful distributional
analysis has shown that in some instances high-
income recipients are the major consumers of
cultural goods, and thus the main beneficiaries of
government support.
Opera is the Queen of live performing arts, and
in some way a conventional art form. Today all
the major opera houses around the world present
relatively similar programmes, produced and
performed by a core group of international
conductors, stage directors, designers and sing-
ers. This has inevitably led to a great similarity in
the core product and standards of the opera
houses. Therefore, the art-form itself dictates to a
great extent the resources and the organizational
structures needed to produce opera.16
The Massimo Theatre in Palermo
With its budget of about s42 millions and more
than 400 employees, the Massimo Theatre is the
third largest public opera company of Italy. More
than 90% of the revenue comes from public
subsidies, the remaining 10% comes from the box
office and the sale of other services. Salaries for
full-time employees represent more than 70% of
production costs.
In the fiscal year 2004 theMassimo Theatre was
in a very difficult financial situation: losses for
s1.5 millions, short-term bank debts for about
s26 millions and production at its minimum. A
new management took over at the beginning of
2005 with the aim of preparing and implement-
ing a 3-year plan to restore viable financial
conditions.
As said, there is essentially one option
available for the opera management to deal with
a structural earnings gap: reducing the gap by
increasing the share of earning income relative to
total operating costs. This strategy can take two
forms: increasing the earned income or reducing
operating costs. On the latter side, the two most
important moves have been to bargain a new
contract with the labour unions on a much more
flexible base, and to negotiate a bankmortgage to
lower debt costs. On the former side, despite the
benefits of increasing earned income, there are
limits to how far opera companies can go in this
direction. In fact, increasing the number of
productions brings not only increased revenue,
but also increased costs. The strategy followed at
the Massimo Theatre was to implement an
appropriate production plan with the aim of
16For example, to stage Verdi’s Aida requires a fairly specific number
of skilled performers, a certain type of sets and performance space,
wherever it is performed, in order to comply with the conventions of
the art form and with the standards of the world of opera.
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maximizing the number of performances, given
the structural and organizational constraints.
The first constraint in enlarging the number of
performances is the fact that the Massimo
Theatre does not have enough facilities to be
used for orchestra end stage rehearsals. Since you
need to use the venue (the theatre itself) also for
the rehearsals, this limits the number of days one
can uses it for performances. This is especially
true when production is organized according to
the Italian system of ‘stagione’ (the season): a
certain number of performances over several
weeks, followed by a rehearsal period for the next
production after which that opera is performed
for the next several weeks, and so on. The typical
stagione at the Massimo Theatre is usually made
by 10–11 productions, 8–9 of which are operas
and 2 ballets. Opera productions are divided in
three groups: at least 3 blockbuster titles (each of
which is staged for 8–12 performances), 3–4
repertory titles (7–8 performances), and 1–2 rare
and/or contemporary operas (4–6 perform-
ances). Since at the Massimo Theatre patrons
subscribe for the whole season, a mix of
repertoire is charged for in the package and this
can ‘cross-subsidise’ less popular repertoire with
popular operas. Each season, of the whole
number of staged operas, usually 3 are newly
produced by the house, the remaining are rented
from other houses and/or re-used from the
Massimo Theatre stock of previous productions.
Supporting Performance Improvement for
the Massimo Theatre Through a Dynamic
Balanced Scorecard
In order to support planning and performance
improvement at the Massimo Theatre, a program
implying the development of a Dynamic
Balanced Scorecard (Bianchi and Montemag-
giore, 2008; Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Linard
et al., 2002; Ritchie-Dunham, 2001) has been
started by the authors.
The analysis is being conducted with the
primary purpose to:
1. Define performance indicators associated to end-
results, with regard to the four dimensions of
the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), that is: custo-
mer, internal processes, learning & growth,
and financial.
2. Understand the key linkages between such
indicators and related performance drivers.
3. Identify the strategic resources affecting per-
formance drivers.
4. Analysing the factors impacting on the
accumulation and depletion flows affecting
strategic resource dynamics, and particularly:
policy levers on which managers can operate,
external constraints, and decision makers
involved, in-and-outside the firm.
At present, the study has been only conducted
with the Director of the theatre. However, when a
first version of the dynamic balanced scorecard
(DBSC) will be completed, it will be shared with
the other managers, with the goal to use it as a
planning and performance evaluation/improve-
ment tool, on a current basis.
Main feedback loops have been identified, in
order to depict the processes affecting the
theatre’s performance. Modelling has been
initially conducted on a qualitative basis through
periodical meetings with the Director. Qualita-
tive modelling has been also supported by the
gradual design of the DBSC structure, and
therefore by the SD simulation model portraying
the BSC.
In particular, the following issues have been
focused from the start of the project till now: (1)
decision levers, that have been included in the
DBSC control panel; (2) performance indicators (i.e.
objectives, measures, and targets) related to the
above four dimensions, which have been
included in the ‘scorecard window’ of the SD
model; (3) reference behaviour modes for key
variables. Such behaviours will be reproduced
into DBSC graph sections related to strategic
resources, performance drivers and end-results,
when the SD model will be calibrated.17
The simulator depicts the same logical
sequence of the planning process for opera
production, which was described in the previous
17Possible source to calibrate the model will from internal company
reports provided by the management information system (e.g. num-
bers of customers, funding from different institutions, revenues,
number of productions and performances).
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section. Therefore, a three-dimensional analysis
is done, that is:
1. The opera mix by type (blockbuster vs. repertory
vs. contemporary/rare) is planned, not only in
percentage but also in absolute terms.
2. For each type of opera, titles by source are
planned. For instance, it is planned howmany
of the blockbuster operas will be made up by
‘new’, ‘rented’, and ‘re-used’ titles; and the
same is for repertory and contemporary/rare
operas.
3. The number of performances by opera type
(blockbuster vs. repertory vs. contempor-
ary/rare) is then planned.
The planning time horizon is 3 years. There-
fore, each year the number of titles and
performances to stage for the coming and the
next 2 years is planned. Planning in advance of
the next season is crucial to properly manage
rehearsals and the acquisition of resources;
among them, human resources are the most
crucial. In fact, particularly concerning blockbus-
ter performances, it is critical to contract best
performers (so called superstars) quite in advance,
in order to pursue a well balanced quality/cost
ratio in the delivered service. Therefore, the
model also supports a proper assessment of the
financial sustainability of the planned seasons.
This is not a trivial issue, if one considers the
above said financial criticalities (previously
defined as ‘cost disease’) that in general, and
more specifically in Italy (particularly in the
South) affect the financial equilibrium of a public
opera house.
Though the planning time horizon is 3 years,
the simulation time is 6 years. This is due to the
need to allow the user to figure out over a longer
time span the possible effects (i.e. the key
variables’ behaviour) of adopted decisions in
the coming years. This also allows managers to
simulate – according a ‘rolling plan’ mode – how
past decisions might require future adjustments,
based on the outcomes they are currently
generating.
Therefore, by using the simulator, managers
are able to adjust and better calibrate their
strategies concerning the above three issues,
and so they are enabled to review and discuss
them several times. This contributes to their own
learning processes and to the quality of com-
munication. Furthermore, since simulation
results are framed by the DBSC model to show
the dynamics of performance, this learning
process has also a significant impact on the
quality of planning and control systems.
Figure 11 shows three main stock-and-flow
diagrams embodied in the model, concerning the
three above issues which are relevant for opera
planning (i.e. opera mix by type; titles by source;
performances by opera type). As it is possible to
notice from the model section here provided,18
the first two structures are depicted as aging
chains: the final flow ‘Blockbuster titles staged in
the current year’ depends on the ability of the
firm to implement its 3 years plan (Figure 11a).
Lack of resources will have a final impact on such
a flow, both in volume and in quality of
performances. Such quality will also be affected
by the opera mix by type. On this regard,
Figure 11c shows how the same flow determines
the number of performances by type.19
The three sequential stocks (and correspond-
ing outflows) relate to the planned season for the
years (from left to right) n# 2, n# 1, n, where the
last year is the current (i.e. the coming year).
The stock-and-flow structure depicted in
Figure 11a determines the number of titles by
source (i.e. new, rented, reused), depicted in
Figure 11b.20 Here, the flow ‘New titles to year 2’
in turn affects (together with the planned ‘rented’
and ‘re-used’ titles) the flow of ‘blockbuster titles
planned to year 2’.
Therefore, the three subsystems are strictly
related each other, and depend on the decisions
made by managers through the simulator control
panel. As it is possible to see from Figure 12, such
panel depicts the same aging chain structure
previously described. Therefore, the planner is
asked to define the number of titles per type and
related mix (new, rented and reused). He/she is
18For reasons of synthesis, we have shown here only the ‘Blockbuster
titles’ stock.
19For reasons of synthesis, we have shown here only the ‘Blockbuster
performances’ stock.
20Also in this case, for reasons of synthesis, we have shown here only
the ‘New titles’ stock.
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also asked to define the number of performances
per each type of title in the next 2 years, and (if
applicable) the change of the number of per-
formances per title planned for the current year.
Other subsystems of the simulator portray the
dynamics of the company human resources, the
customer base, and financial resources. As said,
such resources feedback into the opera pro-
duction and performance subsystems, since they
may either support or hinder the implementation
of plans for opera staging.
The DBSC chart embodied in the model
portrays main indicators related to the four
BSC perspectives. A section, concerning the
‘customer’ and ‘internal processes’ perspectives,
is depicted in Figure 13a and b. Both figures
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Figure 11 (a) Planning opera mix by type. (b) Planning titles by source. (c) Planning performances by type
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embody – according to the BSC framework –
main objectives, performance measures, related
targets as well as the current level achieved for
each of these targets. While performance targets
are input variables, and therefore the corre-
sponding value can be changed by the planner at
the beginning of the simulation, the ‘current
situation’ values are results of the model, and for
this reason have been emphasised in a box with a
different colour from targets, since they can not
be changed. Comparing targets with current
results at each simulation stage and for each set of
strategic objectives supports decision makers to
make judgements on the way the system
responds to the adopted policies. Therefore, it
supports to calibrate better decisions through the
control panel. This process also supports a
deeper analysis focused on the feedback struc-
ture of the relevant system underlying observed
behaviour from adopted policies. Such analysis,
properly supported by a facilitator, is likely to
enhance a double loop learning process (Ster-
man, 1994).
In another section, the simulator separately
portrays, through proper time graphs, the
behaviour of the strategic resources affecting
the above performance indicators. It also shows
in separate sections how the above indicators can
be distinguished into performance drivers and
end-results. Also these two other sections consist
of time graphs.
Figure 14 offers a synthetic representation of
how planning opera production may signifi-
cantly affect the future growth of the theatre.
In particular, the positive loop ‘R1’ shows how
an increase in available resources may allow the
management to plan for more titles and per-
formances, leading (other conditions being
equal) to higher revenues, liquidity and other
available resources to foster future growth.
If the loop ‘R1’ is the growth engine of the
theatre, the negative loop ‘B1’ is a potential limit
to such growth. In fact, the more opera titles (and
performances) are planned, produced, and
staged, the more resources will be consumed.
If we particularly consider that opera production
planning is characterised by a 3-year time
horizon, this means that such phenomenon will
reduce (other conditions being equal) the
resource endowment to fund the next year plan.
The loops ‘B2’ and ‘B3’ refer to the achievement
of targets related to planned operas and
Figure 12 The simulator control panel
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performances. In fact, the higher the gap from the
current to the target number of operas, the higher
the number the opera titles to plan will be. This
will, in turn, decrease the gap in opera titles. The
same for the planning of performances.
The ‘R2’ loop shows the effect of proper opera
planning on image and liquidity. A higher
number of planned and staged operas (and
performances) will increase image. This will help
the theatre to attract financial resources from
private funders. This will increase liquidity and
the available resources to foster sustainable
growth.
The loop ‘R1’ portrayed in Figure 15 is similar
to the same previously commented about
Figure 14. In this case, the effect of perceived
quality as a main driver of customer loyalty is
remarked. In fact, a higher production of opera
titles will lead (other conditions being equal) to a
higher perceived quality by customers. This will
turn into a higher image, customer base, and
liquidity. More financial resources will allow the
Figure 13 (a) Indicators related to the ‘customer’ perspective. (b) Indicators related to the ‘internal processes’ perspective
Copyright! 2010 JohnWiley & Sons,Ltd. Syst. Res.27, 395^420 (2010)
DOI:10.1002/sres
416 Carmine Bianchiet al.
RESEARCHPAPER Syst. Res.
company further growth. This will be possible by
both increasing the number of opera titles/
performances and increasing the number of
contracted superstars that will perform blockbus-
ter and repertory operas. This last option will also
allow the firm to strengthen growth (reinforcing
loop ‘R2’).
There is a number of balancing loops to take
into account, also on this regard. In fact, an
increasing number of operas planned in a season
will raise costs. This – other conditions being
equal – will reduce liquidity to plan for the next
seasons (loop ‘B1’). Likewise, an increase in
contracted superstars will also raise operating
costs and determine a second potential limit to
growth (loop ‘B2’).
Concluding Remarks on the Massimo
Theatre DBSC Case
The above case has shown how SD can support
management to keep under control the key
performance variables driving to the success
Figure 13 (Continued)
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(or failure) of an Opera house, with specific
reference to the Massimo theatre case. More
particularly, the development of a DBSC
is likely to focus management attention on
the trade-offs between performance measures
related to ‘financial’, ‘internal processes’,
‘customer’ and ‘learning and growth’ perspect-
ives. It also helps managers to properly perceive
trade-offs between short and long term effects of
adopted policies, as well as different company
sub-systems. Therefore, likewise any other
DBSC, such tool is likely to foster a learning
oriented-approach to strategic planning and
performance management.
However, more particularly in this case, this
tool supports managers to perceive and frame
specific complexity factors of the public sector,
namely: public funding issues (in terms of
possible sources, volumes and delays), price
policies and stakeholders strategies (municipal-
ity, banks, patrons).
Next steps in the development of the
DBSC will be gathering actual data to feed
the model, conducting simulation runs and
calibrating the model on key variables’ refer-
ence behaviour modes, and involving in using
the model manages from different company
sectors.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The three case-studies analysed in this paper,
though they might seem so different each other,
present a number of common factors, which
support the thesis outlined in the introductory
section, that is: applying SD to foster organiz-
Figure 14 Effects of opera production on financial results and company image
Figure 15 Effects of opera production on perceived quality,
customers and financial results
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ational change, accountability and to support
effective decision making in the public sector
implies a number of challenges which are
contingent, not only because of the specific
complexity of the public sector itself, but also
as a consequence of specific issues that can be
found on a territorial base.
In particular, the role that SD modelling can
play to properly deal with the relationship
between the political and the organizational
system has been discussed both in the public
utility and the health care case-studies.
The role of SD to support the management of a
public sector organization to promptly recover
efficiency and improve outcomes at the same
time, based on the current constraints that the
institutional and political systems determine, has
been the focus of the Massimo Theatre case, but
can be – to some extent – recognised in the other
two cases.
Further research will be needed to validate the
research hypotheses and results here outlined.
On this concern, the analysis and comparison of
more cases and the development of SD simu-
lation models will be necessary.
However, we believe that the findings originat-
ing from the three case-study analysis can
provide the reader and different involved actors
in the public sector, useful insights on the
powerful role SD can play to foster a better
understanding of the causes of poor perform-
ance, and to critically reconsider and refocus
mental models.
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